Recently, I attended a university debate on the topic of drug legalisation, inspiring today’s article. As well as the use of a frustrating number of entirely useless personal anecdotes, the standard pro and anti-drug arguments were made; one person would say criminalising a medical issue is bad, another would say more people using drugs is bad and so on and so forth and as is inevitable in any modern drug debate, plenty of comparisons to Portugal were made.

This was all very quaint, but it failed to answer – or even address – what should be the core question of the drug debate: should the state have a say in what a person does with their own body? To me the answer to this question is an obvious no and I’ll explain why in due time, but by fighting the drug debate exclusively on arguments revolving around costs/benefits, the pro-drug side implicitly accepts that the answer to this question is a yes, so long as the perceived benefits outweigh the costs.

To be clear, I don’t think cost/benefit arguments should never be made, in the political sphere they are a useful starting point to get the ball rolling on drug legalisation and are generally a more appetising approach to the topic for the general public. Rather, I’d say these arguments should be made in conjunction with the argument that the state should never have a say in the bodily autonomy of a rational individual.

My criteria for what constitutes a ‘rational individual’ in this context is simple – it is someone who has the mental capability to fully understand the consequences of their actions in a general sense (ie have a sense of logic), but also fully understands the consequences of their actions in specific situations (ie is fully informed on a topic; in the drugs example the individual must understand the possible effects of using any given drug). This criteria includes almost all human adults but excludes groups like children (as they lack the mental capacity to understand actions and their consequences), certain adults with conditions that severely hinder their mental capacity, and otherwise rational human adults whose mental capability has been temporarily inhibited (usually by alcohol).

Of course, this definition does mean you can be a rational individual in some contexts but not others. If you are informed on the specific consequences of smoking cigarettes regularly than you are a rational individual in that context, but if you are not informed on the specific consequences of having major heart surgery, then you are not a rational individual in that context.

I will continue to use the term ‘rational individual’ or simply ‘individual’ in this way for the rest of the article. Additionally, I will refer to an action performed by a rational individual as a ‘rational action’ or simply ‘action’.

While advocating for total individual freedom with no state interference may initially appear extreme, I aim to demonstrate its validity and justify its integration into discussions. Moreover, my position aligns with established beliefs on bodily autonomy and freedom more closely than might be expected.

Bodily Autonomy, Informed Consent, and the State

It is my fundamental belief that in all manners regarding the body, the rational individual is absolute. By this I mean that the individual and only the individual has the sole legitimate authority to perform actions with or to that body, regardless of whether that action is deemed to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ to the individual. This is ‘bodily autonomy’.

Of course, when that action extends beyond the rational individual’s body, other individuals must be considered. For example, an individual has the inalienable right to use their body for sex, so long as the individual they are having sex with also agrees to it. It is generally agreed that the acceptability of performing the action of sex relies on the informed agreement of both individuals involved. If both parties agree to perform the action of sex, then it is acceptable. If one party doesn’t agree, then it isn’t acceptable. Even in a case where the sex could be considered a ‘bad’ idea (like two 18-year-olds having unprotected sex), the only thing that matters ultimately is consent.

A similar principle is upheld in medical ethics where doctors cannot perform a surgery on an individual unless said individual gives their informed consent. Even in cases where the surgery is ‘life saving’ (something that is predominantly seen as a ‘good’ thing to go through), it would be medically unethical and highly unacceptable to force a patient to undergo this ‘good’ surgery.

In both of these examples, informed consent (which for the purposes of this article is synonymous with my idea of a ‘rational action’) from the individual to perform an action seems to be the overriding factor when considering whether said action is justified or not, the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of the action does not factor into it at all. Furthermore, this is widely seen as an acceptable, uncontroversial position in most political and philosophical spheres, and I am amongst those who agree with this position.

My grievance is in why this principle doesn’t extend beyond these examples. If informed consent determines the acceptability of an action in relation to medical ethics and sex, why can’t it also apply to drugs? Yes doing drugs might be ‘bad’ for you, but as we’ve established the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of an action holds no sway in determining whether someone should be allowed to make that decision.

Ultimately, only the individual can decide whether performing an action is worth doing, as only they can know if the positives of performing that action outweigh the negatives (for them at least). For one rational individual the positives of doing drugs (the pleasure created by them) might outweigh the negatives (medical risks and possibility of dependence) but for another individual the opposite is true. Regardless, both should be allowed to make their own decision, unhindered by state interference.

That being said, the state can – and should – take steps to warn people of the dangers of drugs through the use of advertising campaigns or requiring packaging to explain the potential medical consequences (as is currently done with cigarettes) etc. This is essential as it informs people of what they are potentially getting themselves into, ensuring they are ‘rational individuals’ and allowing them to make an informed decision.

Incorporating the Bodily Autonomy Argument into the Drug Debate

However, despite drug legalisation being a natural extension of bodily autonomy, it’s very rare to hear a debate on drugs in which the pro-drug side argues from a position of bodily autonomy, instead opting to fight on the anti-drug side’s terf, squabbling about the minutiae of whether drugs are more harmful legal or illegal, and drawing comparisons to other, currently legal, drugs like alcohol, cigarettes, and caffeine.

There are certainly some strong and very convincing points that can be made here, and from a practical stance it is probably the best way of convincing people to legalise drugs in the short term. However, it also accepts that there is a line at which the state has the power to override your own bodily autonomy if an action is deemed ‘bad’ enough. This is a dangerous precedent to set as bodily autonomy is one of the most fundamental personal rights we have.

As such, when debating the legalisation of drugs any ‘practical’ arguments around cost/benefit should be made in concert with arguments about bodily autonomy. To do otherwise would be to surrender the terms of play to the anti-drug side, and enshrine the idea that revoking bodily autonomy can sometimes be justified into the cultural psyche.

The images used in this article are all in the public domain.